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Introduction 
Developing countries use a wide range of policies in an effort to 
reach their growth and modernization objectives, but none are more wide-
spread and pervasive across so many countries as are agricultural credit 
policies and programs. In the next few minutes, I'd like to briefly review 
some of the key features of these policies, explain the standard economic 
rationale for associating expanded credit use with increased agricultural 
output, and then discuss some key issues commonly ignored when credit 
policies and programs are developed. 
Common Credit Policies 
It is difficult to discuss agricultural credit policies in their 
entirety in a few minutes. A wide variety of alternatives are being tried 
in developing countries and I know no good way to categorize them. But in 
order to give you an idea of the variety, I developed the following four 
categories which are in no way comprehensive or exhaustive. In the coun-
tries represented in this seminar, there may be several other policies 
which would suggest additional categories. 
1. Quantity of credit. Many countries actively try to increase the quantity 
of credit channeled to agriculture relative to output or relative to the 
quantity of credit going to other sectors. 
*I am indebted to Dale Adams for several ideas used liberally throughout 
this paper. Paulo F. C. de Araujo has helped me over several years to 
understand agricultural credit in Brazil. 
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Incentives are given to lenders through rediscount mechanisms, reserve 
requirements, etc. Quotas may be used in an effort to force lenders to 
shift more of their portfolio to agriculture. The objective may be to 
increase the aggregate supply of credit, or through special lines of credit 
finance selected inputs like fertilizer, or selected crops or particular 
sizes and types of farms. 
2. Credit terms. Probably the most common single policy in developed and 
developing countries alike is some type of usury law designed to protect 
borrowers from high interest rates. Maximum nominal interest rates may be 
established for certain types of loans or loans for a particular sector. 
Other policies affecting terms or conditions of loans are those which estab-
lish maximum repayment period as well as. special lines of credit with a 
grace period on paying principal installments during the initial years of 
the loan. 
3. Use of credit. Some policies focus on influencing how a borrower 
uses credit. Fertilizer may be provided in kind rather than cash to insur.e 
that the farmer doesn't spend the borrowed money on something else. Lenders 
may require that the borrower of operating credit use a full production 
package including improved seed, fertilizer, chemicals, etc. Supervised 
credit is popular in countries which link credit to technical assistance. 
4. Delivery systems. Many countries spend a lot of time trying to perfect 
delivery systems for credit so that farmers receive desired quantitities. 
Some countries rely on existing institutions to.channel credit to agricul-
ture and use normal banking regulation procedures in an effort to achieve 
that goal. ·Others set up special agricultural banks and cooperatives as 
parallel structures to existing lending institutions. 
c 
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These are only four categories of credit policies. The list undoubt-
edly could be expanded. A particular program may fall within several cate-
gories. For example, a small farmer lending institution may be created 
to increase credit supplies and reduce costs to small borrowers. The inter-
est rate may be controlled and subsidized in order to reduce the cost of 
credit to the borrower. 
In spite of the wide variety of credit policies found in many countries, 
there are some coimllon features found in many of them: 
1. Policies are designed for their expected effect on borrowers, while 
ignoring the effect of the same policies on lenders. 
2. Interest rates are normally considered in nominal rather than real 
terms. 
3. There is an assumption that it is possible to "tie" credit to certain 
inputs and products. 
4. There is surprisingly little consideration of the effect of credit 
policies on savings behavior. 
In the time I havP. left I would like to focus on two issues. First is 
the expected relation between credit policies and farmer behavior. Second, 
I want to briefly discuss the effect of credit controls on the lender, and 
specifically the effect of usury laws on supply as well as demand for credit. 
Credit Policies and Farmer Bahavior 
This section is divided into two parts. The first includes the stan-
dard production economic analysis which demonstrates how the quantity of 
inputs used in production may .be constrained due to inadequate financing 
for the farmer. This analysis is the type frequently used in many countries 
which stress agricultural ·credit policies in their development strategy. 
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The second section uses an analysis of sources and uses of liquidity for 
the farm household to show how difficult it is to know precisely how borrowed 
capital will be ttsed by the farm family. 
Economics of Input Use 
The expected effect of credit on agricultural production can be analyzed 
by using a production function relating the cost of using additional units 
of an input to the value of the expected additional output. Since many 
countries try to accelerate fertilizer use through credit policies, I will 
use fertilizer as the input in the following example. The analysis would be 
the same if I would have chosen seed, machinery, labor or any other input in 
production. 
Figure l presents the standard assumed relationship between quantity of 
fertilizer used and the value of the additional crop output produced, holding 
all other factors of production constant. It may be easiest to think of the 
figure in terms of a hectare of corn. All other inputs to produce corn are 
held constant except fertilizer (ignoring the labor and other costs associated 
with applying fertilizer and harvesting additional production). The curve 
labeled marginal value product of fertilizer represents the additional (or 
marginal) amount of corn produced by each additional (or marginal) unit of 
fertilizer applied to the hectare of corn multiplied by the price of corn. 
The curve is downward sloping to indicate that successive increases in fer-
tilizer result in successively smaller increases in corn yields, a condition 
which is generally assumed to exist after some level of fertilization is 
reached. At some point, (represented by Q4) additional fertilizer use 
results in a decrease in total yield. 
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Figure 1. Marginal Value Product of Fertilizer 
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If a farmer is economically rationale and knows with certainty the 
productivity of fertilizer and corn prices, there is an optimum level of 
fertilizer use. That level is obtained when the marginal value product of 
fertilizer (MVP) is just equal to the cost of the fertilizer used, or the 
price of fertilizer if we asswne the farmer's fertilizer price (P) is 
constant irrespective of quantity used. For example, if the fertilizer 
price is equal to P2 , then the optimum useage is ~ where MVP = P 2 • At 
any point to the left of Q2 , MVP">P2 meaning that the returns from using an 
additional unit of fertilizer are greater than its price. Thus, a farmer 
would be encouraged to use more fertilizer. However, at any point to the 
right of Q2, MVP<P2 so the farmer would be inclined to use less fertilizer. 
Likewise, if fertilizer prices drop to P3 the optimwn level of fertilizer 
use increases to Q3 • 
One more condition must be met, however, if a farmer is to actually use 
the optimwn levels of fertilizer identified above. He must have the financial 
resources required to buy the fertilizer. These resources are available from 
three sources: 1) his own liquidity, 2) trade credit from a fertilizer. 
dealer that permits the farmer to buy on time, and 3) loans from institu-
tional or noninstitutional sources of credit which provide cash to purchase 
fertilizer. In the absence of trade credit or loans, a farmer may have only 
enough liquidity to purchase Q1 units of fertilizer, only half the optimal 
level when fertilizer prices are P2 • Thus, the farmer's budget constraint 
may prevent him from using as much fertilizer as desired. By increasing 
credit, a quantity effect may be achieved. That is, the farmer may be able 
to purchase optimal fertilizer quantities when his total liquidity is increased 
with credit. Notice that this effect could occur with both trade credit or 
loans. ~ 
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An additional price effect can often be achieved through institutional 
credit. Several countries control interest rates on institutional credit 
at negative real rates. The net effect is that the real price of fertilizer 
falls for the farmer that purchases fertilizer with credit. It is similar 
to a price decline from, say, P2 to P3 with the resulting increase in opti-
mal fertilizer use from Q2 to Q3 • 
Suppose, for example, that a farmer borrows $1000 for fertilizer at a 
7 percent nominal annual interest rate for 6 months. At the end of the loan 
period, he repays $1035. Suppose, furthermore, that the rate of inflation 
is 10 percent in the same period. At the ;time the loan is repaid each 
cruzeiro is worth 90 percent of its previous value, so the real value of the 
$1035 is approximately $930. This decline in purchasing power of the currency 
in effect represents a $70 discount on the fertilizer price. Therefore, a 
farmer who borrows to buy fertilizer receives a discount not realized by the 
cash customer. 
It might be concluded at this point that increased fertilizer use is 
directly related to t~e quantity and terms of agricultural credit made 
available to farmers. This is an assumption frequently made by policy 
makers when setting up credit programs. A serious mistake is made, however, 
by assuming such a direct relationship between credit and fertilizer. In 
fact, under certain conditions, a farmer may borrow funds earmarked for 
fertilizer but may increase his fertilizer use very little. That possibility 
is discussed in the next. section. 
Credit as a Source of Household Liquidity 
The standard economic analysis used above ignores the fact that the 
typical rural household has several sources of, and uses for, liquidity. 
! 
l j 
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Adams and other researchers have used a_ hydraulic anology such as in Figure 2 
to describe this point. Notice first that a household ~as various forms of 
liquid assets. These assets are complemented by off fa!'Ill liquidity sources 
such as earnings, gifts, etc., and borrowings, both forl'.'.lal and informal loans. 
These borrowings include trade credit as well as loans. All these sources of 
liquidity enter and are controlled by the household. Once a unit of currency 
enters the income stream, it becomes indistinguishable from a unit from 
another source, and can be used like any other unit for household expenditures 
and investments. That is, units of currency are fungible. 
The other important feature of· household behavior demonstrated in Figure 
2 is that a typical household engages in several activities which use liquidity. 
These activities include household consumption, financing operating costs 
(including fertilizer) for farm enterprises, financing operating costs of non-
farm enterprises, and long term farm and non-farm investments. Each one of 
these activities produces a certain satisfaction or utility to the household. 
The relative utility of each may be quite different at any one point in time. 
The household reaches equilibrium in its use of funds when the marginal 
utility of the last unit of currency expended on one activity.is equal to the 
marginal utility of an additional unit expended on any other activities. 
Suppose that a farmer expects a high utility from using fertilizer due 
to the expected returns. He may be able to reallocate existing liquidity in 
order to purchase fertilizer •. If his total liquidity is large enough or the 
household is flexible enough in allocating liquidity, he may be able to finance 
optimum levels of fertilizer use. If not, by using trade credit or loans, he 
may be able to acquire enough additional liquidity to purchase the fertilizer. 
Suppose, however, that the farmer already plans on purchasing an "optimum" 
amoun"t of fertilizer using existing liquidity. This "optimum" may be the 
n "-----
FIGURE 2: Sources and Uses of Farm-Household Liquidity 
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economic optimum described above, or some other level the farmer has decided 
upon based on some decision criteria. It might be no fertilizer at all if he 
is skeptical about its impact on yields or uncertain about weather, prices, 
etc. Providing the farmer additional liquidity may substitute for farmer's 
own funds in the purchase of the "optimum" amount of fertilizer. The liquid;,. 
ity released is then available for other alternatives. Secondly, if the 
terms of the credit are favorable enough relative to the utility of expen-
ditures for other alternatives, credit for fertilizer may be diverted to 
other uses. The higher the expected utility from these expenditures, the 
greater will be the farmer's temptation to divert the credit. Policing cre-
dit use will be difficult. Even providing fertilizer in kind, as is frequently 
attempted, may not effectively resolve the problem if the farmer is able to 
resell it. 
The Brazilian case is an interesting example of the point I am trying 
to make regarding the relationship between credit and fertilizer use. 
Since the mid-1960's the Brazilians have employed several policies to 
increase the supply of credit to agriculture. Nominal interest rates have 
been controlled at levels lower than the rate of inflation so borrowers have 
received subsidies through credit. 
These credit policies have resulted in a rapid expansion in institutional 
credit for agriculture. As can be seen in Table 1, operating loans made in 
1975 totaled almost CR $40 billion (approximately U.S. $4 billion), while 
total loans approached CR $90 billion. The ratio of operating loans to 
agricultural output rose from .07 in 1960 to .37 in 1975, while the ratio of 
total loans to output rose from .13 to .83. The exceptionally rapid increase 
in 1975 was due in part to special lines of credit for coffee recuperation 
and drought relief. 
n e f" 
Table 1. Agricultural Credit and Output, Brazil, 1960-1975 
Net Internal Ratio of Ratio of 
Loans Made During Y~ Product Fran Operating Total loans 
Operati.naf I.oansb/ Total As I..oans Agriculture loans to 'T'Q Product 
v, ue in !975 Value in 1975 in 1975 Product (4/5) 
Year Number ~ Cr..izeiros~ ~fumber.9' Cruzeiro# C:ruzeiro#~ (2/5) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1960 112 3,180 231 6,176 46,493 .07 .13 
1961 184 3,280 285 6,157 48,252 .07 .13 
1962 337 4,910 441 8,302 57,023 .09 .15 
1963 416 4,410 549 7,267 . 50,182 .09 .14 
1964 527 6,560 771 9,864 50,521 .13 .19 
1965 509 5,730 666 8,4133 ·56,875 .10 .15 
1966 529 6·, 700 856 11,539 50,281 .13 .23 
1967 633 9,040 1,029 14,925 53,415 .17 .28 
1968 733 11,470 1,500 21,019 53, 485. .21 • 39 
1969 675 9,624 1,145 20,713 56,737 .17 .36 
1970 649 10,992 1,191 24,648 64,439 .17 .38 
1971 686 12,394 1,253 28,481 76,126 .16 .37 
1972 687 14,706 1,266 35,321 82,608 .18 .43 
1973 771 21,2813 1,400 49,852 95,996 .22 .52 
1974 789 27,757 1,450 61,648 104,15# .27 .59 
1975 1,076 39,446 1,856 39,997 107,80W .37 .83 
~ Source: Various Central Bank and Dank of Brazil reports. Figures represent number and 
value of new loans made. 
b/ From 1960 to 1968, the estimates for operating loans are based on loans rrade by the Bank of 
- Brazil, which was responsible for the majority of agricultural credit lent during the period. 
9' '.Chousands of loans. 
3'' One million cruzeiros. Values adjusted by the Index "2" of Conjuntura Ecx>nanica. 
~ Source: Various issues of Conjuntura F.conanica. 
if Projected fran the 1973 figure by carpourrling a 8.5 growth rate for 1974 and 3.4 for 1975. 
f-' 
f-' 
Reprinted franAraujo, P. and Meyer R., ".Agricultural Credit Policy in Brazil: Objectives and Results." 
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One of the Brazilian objectives has been to modernize agriculture 
through the use of modern inputs. Efforts have been made to increase 
fertilizer use through special lines of credit. The nominal interest rate 
on this credit has ranged from zero to 7 percent most years and large a.mounts 
of money have been lent under this program. As shown in Table 2, fertilizer 
use grew from less than 400,000 metric tons in 1966 to an estimated 2,400,000 
metric tons in 1976. 
There is no clear way of knowing the extent to which this rapid rise in 
fertilizer use was attributed to agricultural credit. In the same time 
period, fertilizer companies rapidly expanded the marketing system to make 
fertilizer supplies more accessible to farmers. Fertilizer salesmen aggres-
sively competed for clients and played an extremely important role in dissemi-
nating information about fertilizer use, costs, and returns. But, an impor-
tant element in their sales strategy was their ability to assist the farmer 
in obtaining credit for the purchase. Thus, it is unlikely that fertilizer 
use would have grown as rapidly as it did without the ready availability of 
cheap credit. However we cannot attribute all this increase to credit be-
cause that would imply that fertilizer use would have been zero without 
credit. Clearly that is not" the case. 
There is some evidence that substitution and probably diversion have 
occured with credit in Brazil. For example, the total quantity of fertilizer 
supposedly financed with credit has occasionally surpassed the amount of 
fertilizer actually sold. There have been reports of fraud where fertilizer 
dealers have inflated the a.mount of fertilizer sold to a farmer so he is 
eligible for larger a.mounts of the low cost credit. 
These problems should be expected when credit is lent at such favorable 
terms as in Brazil. They should be expected, however, whenever the cost of 
c 
c 
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Table 2. Use of Chemical Fertilizers in Brazil, 1966-1976 _"'!__/ 
-- -----North & c,;r;tcr-
Year Northeast South Brn:dl 
(A) (bi (A+B) 
(metric tons) 
1966 28,129 3S2,992 3(31 'l ?~~ 
1967 40,559 . I, 07, =.,L.7 ~<.6,926 
1968 38,426 563,2811 601, 711 
1969 52,462 577,925 630,387 
1970 89,052 909, 515 998,567 
1971 95,041 1,069,994 1,165,085 
1972. 125,508 1,321,034 J.,446,542 
1973 158,702 1,730,612 1,889,3111 
1974 165 ,222 I 1'611 ,360 1,776,582 
-
-·· 
1975 128,357 1 1,559,808 l,8'75,739 
1976 b/ 240,000 ( ·. 2 '160 '000 2,Ll00,000 
a/ E~pressed in Nutrients. Use of F~rtilizer = Domestic Production + Imports. 
b/ Preliminary data. 
Sources: Araujo,~~· (1974) and Prognostico Centro-Sul, 1976-1977, IEA 
(1976). 
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credit is low relative to the utility of additional household l~quidity. 
Substitution and diversion can occur even when real interest ra~es are 
relatively high. A household is rationale to allocate liquidity to those 
alternatives which promise most utility. The use of fertilizer must promise 
high utility if the household is to use scarce liquidity on fertilizer pur-
chase versus several other alternatives. When policy makers ignore this 
point, they deceive themselves by reporting that a certain amo~t of credit 
was responsible for the consumption of a specific amount of fer~ilizer. It 
is impossible to estimate precisely what consumption would have been without 
the credit, but it is unrealistic to think it would have been zero if 
fertilizer use is really profitable. 
Credit Policies and Lender Bahavior 
The next issue I'd like to comment on briefly is the effect of credit 
policies on lender bahavior. I will discuss only interest rate policies 
but several other policies aimed at borrowers have an often ignored perverse 
effect on lenders as well. 
As indicated in the introduction, usury laws exist in many countries. 
The objective is to prevent exploitation of borrowers. The effect of usury 
laws is to reduce interest rates below those that would prevail under free 
market conditions. 
Figure 3 shows a supply and demand curve for agricultural credit assuming 
perfect competition. This condition may not exist in many instances but 
the implications of the analysis may still apply under most conditions. The 
demand curve is drawn downward sloping based on the normal assumption that 
farmers will demand more credit as the nominal interest rate falls. This 
assumption is at the heart of the policies which try to force a reduction 
in interest rates in order to increase agricultural production. What is 
c 
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frequently ignored is that there is also a supply curve for agricultural 
credit. That curve is assumed to be upward sloping to reflect the 
fact that if lenders are going to increase credit supplies, the interest 
rate must rise. Interest pays the cost of increased lending, stimulates 
savers to save more, and helps cover the possible risks a lender may have 
when lending is increased. 
The exact slope or elasticity of the demand and supply curves is 
extremely important in any particular case in determining the impact of 
interest rate controls on lenders and borrowers. Assume for our purpose 
that Figure 3 represents the case of a country where the equilibrium inter-
est rate for agricultural credit would be 15 percent. Assume, furthermore, 
that a 10 percent usury law is imposed~ With a reduced interest rate, 
borrowers would prefer to increase borrowings from Qe to ~· Lenders, 
however, would prefer to reduce the quantity lent from Qe to Q1 • We then 
have a situation of excess demand: borrowers would be willing to borrow 
more at the 10 percent interest rate than lenders are prepared to lend. 
Two outcomes frequently occur when this situation arises. First, 
lenders realize that borrowers are willing to pay more so they increase 
non-interest costs such as application fees, closing costs, etc. Commercial 
banks request that borrowers retain a certain amount of funds in non-interest 
earning accounts (compensating balances). Secondly, lenders ration credit 
to farmers so as to reduce lending costs and risks. Large loans are fre-
quently made to large borrowers with substantial collateral and who are 
personal friends of the lenders. Small farmers with little collateral and 
little social and political status are excluded. 
Recognizing this response by lenders, policy makers frequently intro-
duce quotas designed to force lenders to increase the amount lent at the 
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~ controlled interest rate. These efforts may fail if lenders are able to 
redefine the loans considered agricultural or to distort their statistics 
in other ways. 
There is yet another possible consequence of the usury laws. If they 
are effectively enforced, lenders will have to reduce the interest rate 
they can afford to pay on savings deposits. The central bank frequently 
provides much of the funds lent by the lenders. The lenders come to rely. 
on this easy source of capital and may largely ignore trying to attract 
individual savings. Even if they tried, they may not mobilize many savings 
because of the low interest rate they could afford to pay the savers. 
Thus a situation may develop where few incentives exist for individual 
savings, consumption or holding of unproductive assets is encouraged, and 
lenders develop a dependency on central bank capital. The public sector is 
then forced to mobilize savings through unpopular means of taxation and 
inflation, or through international borrowing. 
The point I'm trying to make in this section is that policies designed 
to help borrowers may tave a perverse and pervasive effect. Usury laws may 
·help the lucky few that receive credit by reducing their interest costs. 
other borrowers may be denied credit, however. Savings may be discouraged. 
Public authorities waste time and talent trying to police unviable regula-
tions, while lenders waste time and talent trying to avoid them. The 
social costs may be very high. Whatever benefits that exist may be largely 
captured by a few large wealthy farmers thereby exacerbating the income 
distribution problem. 
Conclusions ·and Recommendations 
Obviously I've talked more of problems today than solutions. The 
specific problems of your agricultural credit system may well be related 
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to these problems however. What implications are derived from this analysis? 
First, recognize that households have competing uses for liquidity. If 
you want to insure that credit is used for the purpose you intend, be certain 
that the expected utility of additional expenditures for that purpose are 
high. Too often many of the inputs, crops or packages you try to encourage 
do not provide as much expected utility as you assume. Your efforts to 
force borrowers to behave in a manner contrary to their preferences are 
doomed to failure. Be modest about the expected benefits of agricultural 
policies until you know more about how farm households will respond to them. 
The standard production economic theory we typically use to predict behavior 
provides only part of the answer. 
Second, recognize that credit policies designed to affect borrower 
behavior may have equally important perverse impacts on lenders and savers. 
The benefits to borrowers must be weighed against these costs. Efforts to 
force lenders to behave contrary to their preferences are likely to meet as 
many problems as those encountered with borrowers. Lenders are probably 
even more sophisticated than borrowers in beating your rules and regulations. 
In general if agricultural production is really profitable, farmers 
can be expected to respond. Household liquidity will be allocated in order 
to finance production. On the other hand, if production is not profitable, 
cheap credit supplies are likely to have little impact. Much of the emphasis 
on cheap credit in development schemes is premature. We first must evaluate 
how the scheme is perceived by farmers in order to determine if credit is 
really the chief bottleneck. 
- 19 -
c References 
Adams, Dale W., "Policy Issues in Rural Finance and Development," Paper No. l~ 
.. 
Conference on Rural Finance Research, San Diego, July 28 - August 1, 1977. 
Araujo, Paulo F. C. de and Richard L. Meyer, "Agricultural Credit Policy in 
Brazil: Objectives and Results", Paper No. 23, Conference on Rural 
Finance Research, San Diego, July 28 - August 1, 1977. 
Araujo, Paulo F. C. de, et. al., "Crescimento e Desenvolvimento da Agricultural 
Paulista," Agricultura em Sao Paulo, Tomo III, 1974, 169-199. 
Instituto de Economia Agricola, Prognostico Regiao Centro-Sul 76/77, Sao Paulo,. 
1976. 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
' I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
